This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to endogenous heterogeneity by constructing general class of two-player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Introduction
One of the most pervasive presumptions in modern economic analysis is the symmetric nature of interacting agents. While often intended solely as a simplifying assumption on a priori grounds, this presumption has also permeated economic thinking for a variety of other reasons. When considering noncooperative games, analysts often restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium points even when other asymmetric outcomes exist and may reflect more rationalizable or more pertinent behavior. In mechanism design or policy games, the social planner typically assumes identical treatment of identical agents, although global optimality might dictate otherwise. The design of various forms of joint ventures is also subject to a similar observation.
In most cases, the only justification beyond simplicity is what Schelling (1960) convincingly termed the focal nature of symmetric equilibrium outcomes.
Indeed, it is widely recognized that inter-agent heterogeneity is often a critical dimension of several economic and social phenomena. From a positive perspective, heterogeneity is simply a necessary postulate to account for the simple fact that in the real world, one seldom observes identical agents, be it individuals, firms, industries or countries. In a similar vein, even from a normative standpoint, differences across interacting agents often constitute a necessary condition for many important economic activities such as trade or risk-sharing.
Understanding the origins and/or evolution of diversity across economic agents or disparities in economic performance across regions is increasingly perceived as a central goal of economic and social research in a number of different areas (see e.g. Geroski et al. (2003) and Ghemawat (1986) ). Macroeconomists attempt to explain the causes of booms and recessions. Development economists wish to understand the forces behind poor and strong economic performances.
Labor economists attempt to get a handle on discriminatory treatment of some groups of workers. Business strategists and industrial economists devote a lot of attention to the sources and sustainability of inter-firm heterogeneity within and across industries. Overall, much effort has been expanded with a view to explain "the diversity across space, time and groups" (Matsuyama, 2002) .
In view of the diversity of economic research areas involved in this effort, it is not surprising that various conceptual and methodological approaches have been developed in connection with this complex task. While often tailored to a specific area, each of these approaches is broad in explanatory scope and has wide potential applicability. We now briefly review three of these general paradigms that share some relationship to the present paper.
The dominant approach, based on coordination failures, postulates a game with strategic complementarities and multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash equilibrium points. Diversity is then synonymous with making different equilibrium selections, with the high-performing entity picking the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and the low-performing entity failing to do so. This argument is thus generally predicated on the presence of two identical and non-interacting economies, each operating under a different equilibrium out of the same equilibrium set. It may also be invoked to explain diversity across time within the same economy, with booms and recessions corresponding to operation under the Pareto dominant and inferior equilibria respectively. This literature includes as key studies Cooper and John (1988) , Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989) , and is surveyed by Cooper (1999) .
The coordination failures approach has been criticized for failing to offer any compelling argument for the diversity in equilibrium selections in the twoeconomy model or for the regime switch in the one-economy model. Matsuyama (2002) proposes a modification of the former model by creating an interactive link between the two sub-economies and allowing the two players to take two decisions, one in each sub-economy. Under some conditions on the larger game with a priori identical players, namely that the players' actions are pairwise strategic complements and each player's actions are substitutes due to a fixed total resource constraint, multiple equilibria arise with the property that the symmetric equilibrium is unstable while the two asymmetric equilibria are stable, both in the sense of Cournot dynamics. Endogenous heterogeneity in this approach is then predicated on the central postulate that only Cournot-stable equilibria are observable outcomes of this complex game, any of which would involve each agent taking different actions in the two ex ante identical sub-economies. Matsuyama (2000 Matsuyama ( , 2002 Matsuyama ( , 2004 ) coined the term "symmetrybreaking" to refer to this heterogeneity-generating process.
The third approach originates in the business strategy literature, and is often presented as part of a general critique of economic theory. With their traditional emphasis on investigating the workings of firms as complex organizations, strategy scholars have been particularly concerned with understanding the sources and dynamics of inter-firm heterogeneity along various functions and characteristics. In the dominant view, as articulated by Nelson and Winter (1982) , firms operate in such highly complex and ever-changing environments that they entertain no hope of ever accumulating enough knowledge about their world to view it as a strategic game or formulate a precise game-theoretic strategy to guide their overall behavior. Rather, firms grope for economic performance via a heuristic learning process of trial and error and the continual updating of routines and rules of thumb eschewing optimization. In this evolutionary vision, heterogeneity is simply an inevitable outcome of this groping behavior, with firms ending up with different heuristic strategies and core capabilities to implement them. These "discretionary" differences can then be sustained over extended periods of time due to the presence of barriers to successful imitation generated by the differences in core competencies, and also by forces of path dependence in the evolution of firms' choices. This literature often criticizes economic theory for not adequately accounting for inter-firm differences, other than postulating them either as reflecting variations in initial conditions, or as exogenous consequences of the luck of a draw in stochastic models. This failure is attributed to the fact that economic theorists persist, as part of their excessive reliance on complete rationality, in "taking a firm's choice sets as obvious to it and the best choice similarly clear and obvious" (Nelson, 1991 1 An interesting development over the last two decades is a strand of literature straddling the traditional boundaries between industrial organization and business strategy and addressing issues of interest to both fields, making them increasingly related: See Shapiro (1989) , Rumelt, The present paper constitutes an attempt to contribute to this rich debate along standard lines of argument in applied game theory and industrial organization. Consider a two-player symmetric normal-form game characterized by two key properties: (a) actions form strategic substitutes, and (b) each player's payoff, though continuous, admits a key nonconcavity along the diagonal in action space, which results in a jump of the reaction correspondence across the 45 o line. Such a game always admits pure-strategy Nash equilibrium points due simply to the property of strategic substitutes. Furthermore, due to property (b), no such equilibrium could ever be symmetric. At any of the possibly multiple equilibria, which obviously occur in pairs due to the symmetry of the game, otherwise identical agents will necessarily take different equilibrium actions. While this description exactly fits the main result of the paper, we consider two other related classes of games that always possess asymmetric, but never symmetric, pure-strategy equilibria although they are, strictly speaking, not of strategic substitutes. This suggests that the latter property is not as critical as the diagonal nonconcavity property in generating exclusively asymmetric outcomes.
Since payoffs are continuous in actions in all three classes of games under consideration, these games will typically admit a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) . As this would be the only focal equilibrium in the sense of Schelling (1960) , it may reasonably be advanced as a plausible outcome of such a game. Nevertheless, in the actual realization of the equilibrium randomizations, the players will still end up playing different actions with high, if not full, probability. Hence, given a focus on explaining observed heterogeneity, this approach need not rule out mixed strategies a priori.
Towards the goal of generating endogenous heterogeneity, this approach is obviously closest in spirit to Matsuyama's symmetry-breaking explanation. By allowing for suitable discontinuities in the players' reaction curves, it dispenses with the need to interconnect two separate games in the somewhat complex (and subtle) manner proposed by Matsuyama. More importantly, it also provides a framework that is independent of the controversial argument of outright Schendel and Teece (1991) , Roller and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996).
rejecting Cournot-unstable equilibria. Indeed, even when one ignores the focal nature derived from their symmetry, it is worthwhile to observe that these equilibria cannot be ruled out on account of any of the standard Nash equilibrium refinements, such as normal-form perfection or strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986 ). 2 Furthermore, in an experimental setting involving a symmetric two-player game with one unstable symmetric equilibrium and a pair of asymmetric equilibria, Cox and Walker (1998) found little support in the data for any of the three equilibria. This provocative finding suggests that while a
Cournot-unstable equilibrium of a given game may be justifiably regarded as unobservable, it does not thereby follow that some Cournot-stable equilibrium of the same game will necessarily prevail and thus be observable. Rather, the presence of both Cournot-stable and unstable equilibria may engender a high level of indeterminacy, which may critically reduce the predictive power of the game.
Our findings may also be advanced as a rebuttal to the aforementioned criticism from the business strategy literature. Indeed, while sharing their motivation for understanding intra-industry heterogeneity, this approach underlies a general methodology for generating inter-firm differences out of a strategic game with fully rational and completely informed players. The contrast with the evolutionary explanation is rather striking. Instead of discretionary differences that inevitably arise out of the idiosyncratic heuristic response that each firm develops in isolation from other firms as a result of its multi-faceted operation in an extremely complex environment, we uncover strategic differences that arise out of a fully-fledged game-theoretic interaction amongst firms in a simple and completely known environment. We will return to this contrast in the specific context of an R&D game in a subsequent section.
The present paper may also be motivated in relation to various broad strands of literature in industrial economics dealing in some way with strategic endoge-2 Indeed, they are typically strict Nash equilibria (in the sense that a unilateral deviation will lead to a strict loss for the deviator), and thus would survive any of the well-known refinements.
nous heterogeneity along lines similar to ours here. Maggi (1996) for capacity expansion and Amir and Wooders (1999, 2000) for R&D.
There are several other studies in various areas of industrial organization where endogenous heterogeneity emerges in a strategic setting. Hermalin (1994) deals with a two-stage game where firms' choices of managerial structures take place before market competition. Mills (1996) and Amir (2000) deal with R&D games giving rise to equilibrium outcomes with maximal heterogeneity only, i.e.
full R&D by one firm and no R&D by the rival. 3 In public economics Mintz and Tulkens (1986) exhibit asymmetric tax rates for identical member states.
As a second motivation, the present paper is an attempt to develop a unifying approach to understanding symmetry-breaking mechanisms in general classes of two-player games, encompassing many of the cited studies. These two-stage models share two key features that are critical for the symmetry-breaking arguments they present. The first is a fundamental nonconcavity in the payoffs, which may be confined to the diagonal in action space or hold globally, and the second is some form of strategic substitutes in first-period actions, possibly of an abstract sort (more on this in Section 4). While there is quite some variation in the precise manner versions of these two features are present and interact across all the models, we will be able to capture most of them in three separate general results, which though quite distinct at first sight, nonetheless bear some definite relationship at an abstract level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the overall set-up. Sec- 
Setup
This section lays out the general notation for use throughout the paper. The nooncooperative game described below may be a simple one-shot game or it may represent the payoffs of a two-stage game as a function of the first period actions, where the unique second stage pure-strategy equilibrium has been substituted in. In the latter case, which actually covers most of the applications of this paper, we obviously restrict consideration to subgame-perfect equilibria and analyze the resulting one-shot game.
Consider a two-player normal form game Γ given by the tuple (X, Y, F, G).
Let X and Y be the action sets of player 1 and 2 respectively, such that X = Y = [0, c] ⊂ R. The maps F and G : X × Y → R are the payoff functions of players 1 and 2 respectively and F can be expressed as:
By symmetry of the game Γ, G can be expressed as:
Observe that, somewhat contrary to standard practice, the first argument of F is the action of player 1 while the first argument of G is the action of player 2. It is useful to define the following sets:
It will be assumed throughout the paper that U , L, F and G are jointly continuous functions of the two actions. Define the best response correspondences (reaction curves) for players 1 and 2 respectively as r 1 (y) = arg max{F (x, y) :
As usual, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (or PSNE for short), (x * , y Each of the next three sections investigates a separate class of normal-form symmetric games that always possess asymmetric Nash equilibria and no symmetric Nash equilibria. For each of the three classes, we provide a general result establishing both the existence and the inexistence conclusions and an illustration based on previous studies where a special case of the result was derived in a specific setting.
The definitions and main results from the theory of supermodular games used in this paper are reviewed in the appendix in a very simple way, which is sufficient for the purposes of this paper.
Endogenous heterogeneity with strategic substitutes
In this section, we consider a two-player symmetric normal-form game characterized by two key properties. The first is that actions form strategic substitutes.
This means that an increase in one player's strategy lowers the other player's marginal returns to increasing his own strategy. As a result, players respond optimally to an increase of the opponent's choice with a decrease of their own variable. In other words, the best reply correspondences are downward-sloping and a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists (see, Vives, 1990 and Roberts, 1990 ).
The second key property is that each player's payoff, though jointly continuous in the two actions, admits a fundamental nonconcavity along the 45 o line, giving rise to a canyon shape along the diagonal. A key consequence of this feature is that a player would never optimally respond to an action of the rival by playing that same action.
Taken together, these two properties imply that each best reply is a decreasing correspondence with a (downward) jump over the 45 o line. 4 Hence, no PSNE could ever be symmetric. At any of the possibly multiple equilibria, which obviously occur in pairs due to the symmetry of the game, ex ante identical agents will necessarily take different equilibrium actions.
While all three results presented in this paper share this same flavor, the main result in terms of the generality of the assumptions and thus of the scope of applicability is this section's. 4 In this paper, we will say that a function f : R → R is increasing (strictly increasing) if
A correspondence is increasing if its maximal and minimal selections are increasing functions (as in the conclusion of Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem).
The results
Different subsets of the following assumptions will be needed for our conclusions below. The notation is as laid out in Section 2. 5 A full discussion of the assumptions and results is presented at the end of the section. Most of the proofs can be found in the appendix.
A1 says that on either side of the diagonal, but not necessarily globally, each player's marginal returns to increasing his action decrease with the rival's action. A2 holds that each player's payoff, though globally continuous in the two actions, has a kink along the diagonal in the shape of a "valley". The role of A3 is simply to rule out PSNEs at (0, 0) or (c, c).
These assumptions form a sufficiently general framework to encompass many of the studies mentioned in Section 1 as illustrated below. Furthermore, all three assumptions are easy to check in a particular model. The idea of the proof is that overall submodularity of the payoff function is inherited from the submodularity of its components U and L in the presence of assumption A2. We know from Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem that global submodularity of the payoff function implies globally decreasing best replies.
Assumptions A2 − A3 imply that the best replies have a downward jump that crosses over the diagonal. This situation is depicted in figure 1 . 6 (We caution the 5 In addition, throughout the paper, partial derivatives are denoted by a subindex corresponding to the relevant variable, i.e.
and U 2 (x, y) = ∂U(x,y) ∂y . 6 Notice that unusually x is the variable in the vertical axis. This corresponds to analyzing the game from the point of view of player 1 that chooses x as a response to y. We maintain this convention throughout. The complete proof can be found in the appendix. The next result adds further restrictions of a general nature on the payoff components of our game that lead to a unique pair of PSNEs, which are then necessarily Cournot-stable. 7 In this case, symmetry-breaking is coupled with 7 It is worthwhile to point out here that our results indicate an even total number of PSNEs, in apparent conflict with the well-known odd number results. The explanation is that the latter results are based on degree theory and require continuity of the best-response form. Given more predictive power of the game, although the selection of one PSNE from the pair still remains indeterminate, as is standard in symmetric settings. 8 Theorem 3.2 Assume that U and L are twice continuously differentiable and that the following holds:
then there is exactly one pair of PSNEs. prefer the PSNE where he is the low-activity player.
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Theorem 3.3 Let x * > y * , so that (x * , y * ) and (y * , x * ) are equilibria in ∆ U and ∆ L , respectively. If A1 − A3 hold and moreover U (r 1 (y), y) and L(r 1 (y), y)
There is a dual statement giving conditions under which each player would prefer the high-activity equilibrium, given any pair of PSNEs. Being obvious from Theorem 3.3, it is omitted for the sake of brevity.
our systematic and robust jump across the diagonal, our findings are actually consistent with the odd number result in a generic sense. 8 As mentioned in the Section 1, assumptions A1 − A3 imply that our game admits a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, in the actual realization of such an equilibrium, the two players will be heterogeneous with high, if not full, probability. 9 This monotonicity assumption is clearly more general than assuming that each player's payoff is increasing in the rival's action. For an example illustrating this point, see von Stengel (2003).
Applications
In this section we present examples of economic models that constitute special cases of the general framework developed above. While the assumptions validating Theorem 3.1 might at first appear somewhat special, they are satisfied in several a priori unrelated studies that have established endogenous heterogeneity in strategic settings. There are also some studies where asymmetric equilibria are produced via a mechanism similar to our Theorem 3.1, without being a special case in a formal sense. Going over some of these examples illustrates the unifying character of our results and allows us to provide some contextual interpretations of endogenous heterogeneity, or our version of symmetry-breaking.
R&D investment
The first example is based on the model by Amir and Wooders (2000) . Two a priori identical firms with initial unit cost c are engaged in a two stage game of R&D investment and production. In the first stage, autonomous cost reductions x and y for firms 1 and 2, respectively, are chosen. The novel feature of this study is that spillovers are postulated to flow only from the more R&D active firm to the rival, but not vice versa. The effective (post-spillover) cost reductions X and Y when x ≥ y are given by:
x with probability β y with probability 1 − β
Second stage product market competition, be it Cournot or Bertrand, is assumed to have a unique PSNE with equilibrium payoffs given by Π : [0, c] 2 → R.
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Π(x, y) is the payoff of the firm whose unit cost is the first argument. f : C1 Π and f are twice continuously differentiable 10 This is a standard assumption in the literature.
C2 Π is strictly submodular and Π 1 (x, y) < 0 and
The overall payoff of firm 1, F (x, y), defined as in (1), is given by the difference between its second stage profit and first stage R&D cost. The payoff of firm 2 is G(y, x) by symmetry.
We can easily check that assumptions A1, A2 and A3 indeed hold in order to apply Theorem 3.1. U and L are continuous and differentiable because they result from the sum of continuous and differentiable functions.
, so F and G are continuous. A1 can be checked by using the cross-partial test and the fact that Π(x, y) is submodular (Assumption C1).
Also, Using C2, and
we obtain that
From Theorem 3.1, we can conclude that payoff functions for both players are submodular and thus reaction curves are downward sloping and there exists at least one PSNE. Moreover the reaction curves do not intersect the diagonal and by C6, U 1 (0, 0) > 0 and L 1 (c, c) < 0, so there is no symmetric equilibrium Amir and Wooders, 2000) .
This model provides a good opportunity for a typical economic interpretation of strategic endogenous heterogeneity in a context that is of particular interest to business strategy scholars. Indeed that field typically attaches a great deal of importance to the innovation process and to its central role in dynamic competition. The key driving force behind asymmetric equilibrium outcomes here is the one-way nature of the spillover process. A firm will always react by performing either less R&D than its rival knowing that it may free ride on the difference in R&D levels, or, in case the rival's R&D is simply too low, by overtaking it. In this vision, firms will endogenously settle into R&D innova- This difference in one key component of firms' overall strategies will then be a causal factor, through natural complementarity-reinforcing developments, for heterogeneity in other aspects of firms' strategies, including in particular firm size and organization (see Amir and Wooders, 1999 for details). This perspective stands in sharp contrast to the explanation for inter-firm differences characterized by idiosyncratic groping behavior on the part of firms and weak interaction amongst them in a world of high uncertainty and complexity, as often envisioned in the strategy literature.
Provision of Information
The second example deals with the provision of information in Bertrand oligopoly, see Ireland (1993) . Two a priori symmetric firms produce a homogeneous product and play a two stage game. In the first stage, each firm sets the level of its product information and in the second stage they compete in prices. Information regards only the existence of the product. Consumers may obtain costless information about prices of products that they know to exist. The number of consumers is normalized to 1. The variables x and y are the proportions of consumers who know about product 1 and 2 respectively. Each consumer is not willing to pay a unit price higher than 1. Firm 1's sales are given by:
For x = y = 1 the Bertrand oligopoly has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at p 1 = p 2 = 0. If information is not full (x or y or both are less than 1), no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium given by the distribution function G i (p i ) that has the following form respectively for firm 1 and 2 .
The overall payoff for (say) firm 1 in the game, upon substituting the second stage equilibrium payoffs, is given by
It is trivial to show that assumptions A1, A2 and A3 are verified in this example. There exists an equilibrium and this equilibrium cannot be symmetric for p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover U 1 (0, 0) > 0 and L 1 (1, 1) < 0. So we can conclude from Theorem 3.1 that no symmetric equilibria exist for p ∈ [0, 1] . The number of equilibria may be obtained by finding the explicit form of the reaction curves. Figure 2 illustrates that there exists exactly one pair of pure strategy Nash equilibria, namely (1, 
Endogenous heterogeneity without monotonic best replies
In the previous section we discussed symmetry breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavity of the payoff function. In this section we extend the analysis from the previous section to encompass other forms of strategic interaction.
The main difference is that agents' strategies form (partially) strategic complements. This occurs when a more aggressive strategy from one agent rises the other player's marginal returns to increasing his own strategy. Consequently, an increase of the opponent's choice is responded to by an increase of own choice variable. This property implies that best-replies are increasing in own action.
As stated above, strategic complementarities are partial in the sense that they are not observed overall. Reaction curves are piecewise increasing, however due to a symmetry breaking nonconcavity in the payoff function, they possess a jump down across the diagonal. The common aspect to the whole analysis is the canyon shape of the agents' payoff functions along the 45 o line. Once again, a player would never optimally respond to an action of the rival by playing that same action. Whereas in the previous section the submodularity of the payoff function (or alternatively the strategic substitutability) was a global feature, in this section we cannot state global supermodularity (or strategic complementarity). The main consequence is that we cannot guarantee without further assumptions the existence of a PSNE. Nevertheless, when it exists, it will never be symmetric.
When strategies are strategic complements, there is no need to assume the quasiconcavity of the payoff function in order to guarantee the existence of a PSNE. The reason is that existence might be based on the fact that reaction curves are increasing and continuity plays no role. Likewise, when payoff functions are quasiconcave supermodularity is not crucial for arguing the existence of a PSNE. When player's payoff function is partially quasiconcave and possesses a nonconcavity along the diagonal, we obtain the same type of symmetry-breaking already discussed. In this case, reaction curves are continuous (not necessarily increasing), except for the jump across the diagonal. Existence of PSNE can be assured (as before) via added conditions, however it is clear that no PSNE can be symmetric.
We provide now the main results of this section, first for the case in which strategic complementarities are present and then for the case of partially quasiconcave payoff functions.
In this section we analyze the case in which the components of the payoff function, U and L, are not submodular. We first consider the case in which U and L are supermodular and then the case where U and L do not have this property, which is replaced by quasiconcavity.
Consider the following assumptions:
B1 U and L are supermodular.
B2 U and L are differentiable and
Define r 1 (y) = arg max{U (x, y) : (x, y) ∈ ∆ U } and r 1 (y) = arg max{L (x, y) :
B1 says that on either side of the diagonal, but not necessarily globally, each player's marginal returns to increasing his action increase with the rival's action. B2 holds that each player's payoff, though globally continuous in the two actions, has a valley-like shape along the diagonal. B3 is responsible for the uniqueness of the jump in the reaction curves. B4 excludes the existence of equilibria in (0, 0) and (c, c). Finally, B5 restricts the reaction curves to a compact subset of the action space which enables us to prove the existence of an asymmetric PSNE.
These assumptions form a sufficiently general framework to encompass many of the studies mentioned in Section 1 as illustrated below. Furthermore, all assumptions are possible to check in a particular model. 
This Lemma guarantees that the reaction curves possess a jump and that this jump is unique. The flavor of the proof is the following: given supermodularity of U and L, we know that reaction curves are increasing in ∆ U and in ∆ L .
Assumption B2 implies that there is no interior symmetric equilibrium due to the presence of a canyon along the diagonal. Furthermore, assumption B4 rules out symmetric equilibrium on the boundary. This is equivalent to saying that the reaction curves do not intersect the diagonal on the whole strategy space.
Hence, there must be a jump across the diagonal. Finally assumption B3, that entails an idea of monotonicity of maxima along y, guarantees that in case a jump occurs, it is unique. From this Lemma we can conclude that the reaction curves possess a jump across the diagonal in a point d and that once it occurs, the reaction curves never jump back again. The point d is useful to define subsets of the strategy space, which are necessary in the next theorem.
The following theorem implies that no symmetric PSNE exists for a game where assumptions B1 − B5 hold and that a PSNE exists. From these premises we can conclude that there are only asymmetric PSNEs. 
in the sense that they are completely contained in these compact subsets of the strategy space.
We obtain, hence, increasing maps in compact sets and Tarski's Fixed Point
Theorem can be applied to show that within these sets a PSNE exists.
Note that we can reorder one player 's action set in a nonstandard way to obtain a submodular game. Consider action space of (say) player 1 as B1' U and L are quasi-concave.
The assumption B1 can be replaced by the assumption B1 0 which guarantees that player's best replies are continuous (not overall) and still the result holds.
In other words, the supermodularity of U and L is not necessary (even though often observed in applications) for the existence of only asymmetric PSNE in this framework. In particular, assuming that U and L are quasiconcave implies The proofs of these results follow the same reasoning as the proofs of the precedent ones, however, existence of PSNE is now guaranteed through the application of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (which is suitable given that payoff functions are quasiconcave).
Uniqueness of a pair of equilibria can be shown if reaction functions are contractions by using Banach's Fixed Point Theorem as in the previous section.
A comparison of equilibria when payoff functions are partially supermodular (or quasiconcave) can be done in the same spirit of Theorem 3.3. Instead of assuming A1 − A4 we assume B1 − B5 (B1 0 − B5). In the proof, the second inequality follows now from the fact that x * ≥ d and Assumption B3.
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Adopting the results of Echenique (2004) , wherein the order on the action spaces is not exogenously given would enlarge the scope of supermodular games.
In particular, since our game here has at least two PSNEs, one can always find a partial order such that it becomes a supermodular game (Echenique, 2004, Theorem 5).
Applications: Quality Investment
We illustrate the results of this section with two papers dealing with quality investment problems. The first paper we analyze is Aoki and Prusa (1996) . In this paper, two identical firms produce products differentiated by quality, in a two-stage setting. In the first stage firms 1 and 2 decide the level of quality investment x ∈ [0, c] and y ∈ [0, c] respectively, and in the second stage they simultaneously announce prices. 12 Consumers are diversified in their willingness to pay for quality. Production cost is assumed to be 0 and firm 1 (firm 2) incurs a cost of quality investment given as follows:
Now we can check whether assumptions of Theorem 4.1 are fulfilled. Given that U and L are differentiable we can check supermodularity (Assumption B1)
by recurring to Topkis's Characterization Theorem. Consider that
To check B3 we compute:
Since r 1 (y) > y > r 1 (y) the condition B3 holds. We know, hence, that the reaction curves are upward sloping except for a downward jump at a point d.
Since U (0, 0) is not defined we cannot check the first part of B4 directly, we must compute lim x→0 U 1 (x, x). We obtain lim x→0 U 1 (x, x) = 4 9 > 0 which means that increasing quality investment at point (0, 0) is profitable for both firms. Point (0, 0) is thus ruled out as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. As for the second part of B4, it is easily verified by the fact that To apply Theorem 4.1 we must also check, whether B5 is verified. To this end, we must find the point d where the reaction curve has a jump. If the reaction curve is given implicitly, there is no algorithm to find this point d,
however it is possible to find it through numerical methods. In the case of the model by Aoki and Prusa (1996) , the point d is equal to The second paper that can be analyzed under our framework is Motta (1993) .
He develops two versions of a vertical product differentiation model, one with fixed and the other with variable cost of investment in quality. In each of them, he compares price versus quality competition. The model with fixed cost and price competition can illustrate the results of this section. Considering the same notation as in Aoki and Prusa (1996) , the payoff function is defined as follows:
Where v is the upper limit of the set of consumer's taste parameters. This model is analogous to Aoki and Prusa (1996) if we let v = 1 and k = Proof. From the definition of strict quasi-convexity, we know that: 
Applications
This theorem generalizes the results of Amir (2000) and Mills and Smith (1996) , whose models are usually presented within the literature about endogenous heterogeneity of firms. 13 In these papers it is considered a two-stage duopoly game.
In the first stage, firms make long term investment decisions that affect the production costs. In the second stage, firms compete à la Cournot. Both firms face 13 Another example where the game can be reduced to a two person normal form game is presented in Boyer and Moreaux (1997) . Conditions for the non-existence of symmetric equilibria are the same, even if the payoff function is not convex. 
Extensions
Most of the results of the previous sections depend on some form of monotonicity of the reaction curves. We used the cardinal notions of complementarity and substitutability to obtain this property mainly due to its convenient char- Let F be defined as in (1) and consider the following assumptions:
A10 U and L have dual single crossing property
The Assumption A1 0 is alternative to Assumption A1 defined in Section 3 and provides the ordinal condition for the reaction curves to be decreasing. Assumption A4 expresses monotonicity of U and L with respect to the opponent's action along the best replies.
We now show the main result of this section in the following steps: first we conclude about decreasing best-replies; then we observe that there is a downward jump in the reaction function at point d and that this jump is unique. Finally we use Topkis fixed point theorem to conclude of the existence of equilibria in the subsets of the strategy space defined using point d.
Finally we treat the setting of Section 4, extending its results to the ordinal definitions of complementarity. Some results from Section 4 can also be extended into an ordinal version.
Let F be defined as in (1) and consider the following assumption: 
Conclusion
Our theorems assert that, under specific conditions, heterogeneity in agent's behavior might arise even when they are a priori identical. This paper constitutes, hence, a contribution to the discussion about the sources of diversity across economic agents and disparities in economic performances. While previous literature stands on arguments related to multiplicity of equilibria and strategic complementarities (Cooper, 1999) or on strategic substitutability and stability of equilibria (Matsuyama, 2002) , our approach stands on the existence of a fundamental nonconcavity of the payoff function and on some form of strategic substitutability. It is, thus, similar in spirit to Matsuyama's work. However, we show that endogenous heterogeneity does not rely on the idea that only stable equilibria are observable as in Matsuyama. With respect to Cooper's approach, where agents can still choose symmetrically, our results guarantee that symmetric equilibria can never arise in a two player setting. Even though we have, in our model some form of strategic substitutability (notice that when talking about two-player games strategic substitutability can be converted into complementarity through a simple inversion of one agent's strategy space), the critical assumption for the inexistence of symmetric equilibria is the nonconcavity of the payoffs. In fact, we show that strategic substitutability can be replaced by partial quasiconcavity and still the results follow.
An alternative explanation for endogenous heterogeneity can be found in business strategy literature. Our results can also be considered as a response to its critique as asymmetries arise here in a completely deterministic and rational setup. We should thus expect that heterogeneity generated in such a framework can be the origin of long-term diversity.
8 Appendix
Summary of supermodular/submodular games
We give an overview of the main definitions and results in the theory of supermodular games that are used in the paper, in a simplified setting that is sufficient for our purposes. Details may be found in Topkis (1978).
14 Let I 1 and I 2 be compact real intervals and F :
Theorem 8.1 (Topkis's Characterization Theorem) Let F be twice con-
The supermodularity property is not preserved by monotonic transformations of the function F . An alternative notion (ordinal) is the single crossing property defined as follows: F has single crossing property [dual single crossing property] in (x, y) if ∀x 1 , x 2 ∈ I 1 , x 2 > x 1 and ∀y 1 , y 2 ∈ I 2 , y 2 > y 1 we have
The single crossing property does not have a correspondent differential characterization and thus it is often more difficult to check. Now we present the main monotonicity theorems. 14 Other aspects of the theory may be found in Topkis (1979) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) . We can introduce now the notion of supermodular game and of its properties.
A two player game is supermodular (submodular) if both payoff functions are continuous, supermodular (submodular) and both action spaces are compact real intervals. 15 The fixed point theorems associated with this framework are due to Tarski (1955) .
be an increasing function, then f has a fixed point.
Theorem 8.5 A two player supermodular (submodular) game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In general, this theory dispenses with assumptions of concavity or differentiability of payoff functions, making it an extremely general framework to study the properties of equilibria.
Proofs of Section 3
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is organized as follows: we begin with proving four preliminary lemmas, and then present the main proof in two steps: first we show existence of PSNE and afterwards that all PSNEs must be asymmetric.
The first lemma states that for a small enough square of points on the diagonal we have submodularity.
Lemma 8.1 Consider the following points as depicted in figure 5 . If A1 − A2
hold, then for small enough α > 0 :
15 Compactness is not necessary, it is required in order to use a simplified version of Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem, without referring to lattices.
Proof. (Lemma 8.1) Take any point (x, x) on the diagonal, belonging to the domain of F . For α > 0 small enough
Hence, from A2:
From A1 we know that
Take b ε > 0 such that
From continuity of U (x, y) in x (for fixed y = x − α), it follows that
Moreover,
This allows us to establish that:
since, for |A| < ε and |B| < ε, then A − B < 2ε.
Rewriting (21), Figure 5 : Square of the length α.
Finally, summarizing, we have:
where, the first inequality comes from (20) , the second one from (19) and the last one from (22) . So we obtain,
Subtracting b ε from both sides ends the proof.
The next lemma extends the property of submodularity of F form the small square of length α to any square with two vertices on the diagonal.
Lemma 8.2 If Lemma 8.1 holds, then for any square with points in the diagonal, such as depicted in figure 7 , we have,
Proof. (Lemma 8.2) Consider the square formed by the four points defined in the lemma. Divide this square into rectangles such that their height is equal to the original height of the square and its length is not bigger than α, as defined in Lemma 8.1. We will now show that for points in the vertices of such rectangles the thesis holds and a fortiori it is possible to obtain the conclusion for the whole square. Figure 6 illustrates the proof.
Let x − z = kα, where k ∈ R, and α > 0 is small enough. Now consider the rectangle defined by the following points (x, x), (x, x − α), (z, x) and (z, x − α) .
From Lemma 8.1 we know that
Also, from A1 we know that
Adding these two inequalities we obtain that
Repeating the procedure, consider the rectangle defined by:
. From A1 we know that:
and also
Using Lemma 8.1 we know that
Adding the three inequalities we obtain:
From (24) we obtain We can repeat this argument k times until getting a rectangle whose length is not bigger than α. Once again we apply assumption A1 and Lemma 8.1 to show that submodularity holds for this rectangle as well and we can conclude that,
Hence submodularity is satisfied for any square with vertices coinciding with the diagonal.
The following Lemma establishes that the analysis of submodularity of any rectangle formed by four points of the domain [0, c] 2 can be reduced to the analysis of submodularity for points placed in such a way that they form a square with vertices coinciding with the diagonal. situation depicted in figure 5 as we now show, say for F . Consider the case of figure 7 with the four points (x, z), (z, z), (x, y) , (z, y) as shown. With z < x < y,
From Lemma 8.2, submodularity holds for the configuration of the square (x, x), (z, x), (z, z), (z, x), hence we have
Adding the two inequalities yields
which is just the definition of submodularity for the original points (x, z), (z, z), (x, y) and (z, y).
It can be shown via analogous steps that the submodularity of F for any other configuration of points can be reduced to showing submodularity for squares with two vertices on the diagonal. The details are left out.
The next result allows us to conclude that the two reaction curves always admit a discontinuity that skips over the diagonal, a key step for our endogenous heterogeneity result. From assumption A3, we know that (0, 0) / ∈ Graph r i and (c, c) / ∈ Graph r i (i.e. r i does not go through (0, 0) or (c, c)). These two properties imply that r i cannot be identically 0 or c.
We next show that the reaction correspondence r 1 (say) cannot ever cross the 45 o line at an interior point, i.e. in (0, c). The generalized first order condition for a maximum of F (say) to occur at a point (x, x) with x ∈ (0, c), which applies even in the absence of differentiability, is that 
, which is increasing given that each of r 1 | ∆ U and r 2 | ∆ U is decreasing. From Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem, we know that there exists 
L11(r2(x),x) ≥ −1. Hence, r 1 (y)| ∆ U and r 2 (x) | ∆ U are contractions. Using Banach's fixed point theorem we can conclude that there exists exactly one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in ∆ U . 16 In the same way there exists exactly one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in ∆ L . Concluding, we have exactly one pair of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Finally we provide a proof of Theorem 3.3. 
where both inequalities follow from the monotonicity of U (r 1 (y), y) and L(r 1 (y), y).
Proofs of Section 4
First we prove Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 since these proofs are similar. We then move to proving Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
16 (Banach's Fixed Point Theorem): Let S ⊂ R n be closed and f : S → S be a contraction mapping, then there exists x ∈ S : f (x) = x.
Proof. (Lemma 4.1) We consider the area ∆ U . From B1 and Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem, we know that the reaction curves are increasing. The generalized first order condition for a maximum to occur in the point (x, x) in the absence of differentiability of F (and G, by symmetry) is that U 1 (x, x) ≤ L 1 (x, x) . Assumption B2 rules out this possibility so we have that no y (nor x), belonging to (0, c), can be best reply to itself, meaning that the reaction curves do not cross the 45 o line. Assumption B4 excludes that 0 can be a best reply to 0 and that c can be a best reply to c. Hence, there must exist a d ∈ [0, c], such that
To exclude the possibility of another jump we use assumption B3. Consider We may now show that only asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.
Proof. (Theorem 4.1) Consider R ⊂ ∆ U as defined in Section 4. Define as before the restricted reaction curves as r 1 (y)| ∆ U and r 2 (x)| ∆ U . From assumption B5, the best reply of player 1 to y = 0 cannot be less than d as U is decreasing in x for y = 0 when x < d. For y > 0, and given assumption B1 (supermodularity),
Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem allows us to conclude that the best reply of 1 is increasing. Hence r 1 (y)| ∆ U ∈ R. Seemingly the best reply of player 2 for x = c cannot exceed d as L is decreasing in y when x = c. Also by Topkis's, the reaction curve is an increasing map. Therefore r 2 (x)| ∆U ∈ R. Consider the mapping, B : R → R such that B(x, y) = (r 1 (y), r 2 (x)). B(x, y) is an increasing correspondence, given that both its components are increasing. R is a compact set and hence we may use Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem to conclude that there exists a pair (x,ȳ) such that B(x,ȳ) = (r 1 (ȳ), r 2 (x)). (x,ȳ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Finally, by Lemma 4.1 we know that no equilibrium can be symmetric.
Proof. (Theorem 4.2) Define R, r 1 (y)| ∆U and r 2 (x)| ∆U as before. From assumption B5, r 1 (y)| ∆ U ∈ R and r 2 (x)| ∆ U ∈ R and from assumption B1 0 they are continuous. Consider the mapping B : R → R such that B(x, y) = (r 1 (y), r 2 (x)). B is a continuous correspondence, given that both its components are continuous, R is a compact set and hence we may use Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem to conclude that there exists a pair (x,ȳ) such that B(x,ȳ) = (r 1 (ȳ), r 2 (x)). (x,ȳ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.2 we know that no equilibrium can be symmetric.
Proofs of Section 6
To prove the theorem we first formulate a useful lemma. 
